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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the take-up rate or claim-waiting rate of the unemployed under the South 
African Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) system. The goal is to identify disincentive effects that 
income replacement rates (IRR) and accumulated credits may have on the claimant‟s behaviour in 
terms of their claim waiting period rate (or how quickly they apply for UIF benefits). Utilizing 
nonparametric and semi-parametric estimation techniques, we find that there is little evidence, if any, 
for job disincentives or moral hazard problems. More specifically, the majority of claimants that are 
quickest to claim the UIF benefits are those who have worked continuously for at least four years and 
accumulated the maximum allowable amount of credits.   
 
We also note that claimants‟ claim-waiting periods are indifferent with regard to levels of income 
replacements yet extremely sensitive to the amount of credits accumulated. Ultimately, the recipients 
of the UIF benefits do not depend heavily on the replacement incomes and prefer waiting longer for 
employment opportunities to arise as opposed to exhausting their accumulated credits. The semi-
parametric Cox‟s Proportional Hazard (PH) model confirms that there is a positive relationship 
between the claimant‟s accumulation of credits and the associated take-up rate of the UIF.  
 
JEL Codes: J01; J08; J18; J64; J65 
 
Keywords: Cox proportional hazards model, Claim-waiting period, Unemployment Insurance Fund 
(UIF), Income Replacement Rates (IRR), Semi-parametric models, unemployment benefits, Survival 
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Unemployment Insurance (UI) is a financial compensation mechanism, offering qualified workers a 
subsistent income replacement in case of income loss due to unemployment shocks, and is prevalent 
in many countries around the world. It forms part of the wider spectrum of welfare policies, and 
operates by pooling the unemployment risk of employees. UI helps to smooth the consumption 
patterns of recipients and their dependents if they become unemployed. More importantly, the UI 
system‟s goal is to improve the transition process of employees from unemployment to employment.  
 
Although UI programs are aimed at empowering employees to search for new jobs and provides them 
with protection against consumption shocks in case of job losses, the system imposes costs as well. 
By raising the reservation wages of unemployed, the UI system introduces the potential loss of 
worker‟s willingness to work and increases wage pressures for the employers. Solutions to solve 
these disincentive effects involve up scaling monitoring and disciplining efforts, as well as imposing 
more stringent requirements in order to qualify for benefits. However, solutions such as benefit 
sanctions and work criteria put even more cost pressures on both employees and employers. On 
occasion, positive measures to promote job-search and skills development like retraining and up-
skilling programs for the unemployed have also been tried, thus attempting to prevent the possibility 
of moral hazard problems from occurring (Vodopivec 2004).  
 
In trying to determine the extent of moral hazard problems in the behavioural context, traditionally, 
researchers would focus on the duration of unemployment spells and the subsequent employment 
destinations after the spells. This paper, however, adopts a new approach, in that instead of 
examining the duration of claiming the UI benefits, it focuses on what we term, the claim-waiting 
period
1
 hazard rate or take-up rate
2
. More specifically, the paper considers the take-up rate of the 
unemployed, or the time taken for the unemployed who are eligible for UIF benefits to claim these 
benefits. Put differently, the paper attempts to describe and understand the determinants of the 
waiting period of people who are just out of work, prior to their formal application for unemployment 
benefits. This waiting period is the first critical stage of individual‟s post-employment decisions as they 
choose whether to re-enter the job market or to stay on insurance benefits. It contains the important 
information about the behaviour of the recently unemployed. By analysing the length of this period, we 
shed light on the extent of the moral hazard problem through outcomes such as sporadic employment 
episodes, low number of accumulated credits and so on. 
 
Since this paper is the first known attempt in South Africa tackling the behaviour of the unemployed 
with regard to UI, Section 2 provides a detailed literature and empirical review of the UI‟s influence on 
the unemployed. In Section 3, we narrow the focus on the local Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) 
system and the new-claimants data, which forms the backbone of this study. Sections 4 and 5 present 




2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
 
The most common argument against the establishment of unemployment insurance is the resource 
constraint argument. It argues that insurance benefits will raise the post-unemployment reservation 
wage (Burgess & Kingston, (1976), Hoelen (1977), and Barron & Mellow (1979)), thereby prolonging 
the duration of unemployment and deepening the level of structural unemployment in the economy. It 
has also alternatively argued however that unemployment insurance has a positive impact on the 
decisions of the unemployed. For example, unemployment benefits could improve the transition 
process by shifting and smoothening the budget constraint of the individual, giving that agent more 
time and resources to look for better future employment opportunities. In turn, workers who are 
eligible for unemployment insurance in the event of unemployment have a stronger bargaining 
position, thus facilitating a more successful and optimal job-matching process.   
                                                     
1  The claim-waiting period is defined as the time taken by workers who are out of job to apply for unemployment insurance at 
the labour centres. 
2 The terms „take-up‟ rate and „claim-waiting period hazard rate‟ shall be used interchangeably throughout the paper, as both 
terms essentially are referring to the same transition period of the unemployed applying to claim UIF benefits (see Section 4 
for detail). 




Unfortunately, evidence to support the benefits of unemployment insurance is weak, and dependent 
on individual countries‟ labour markets and unemployment insurance policies. The literature identifies 
the moral hazard problem (through substitution) as the most important negative impact of the UI 
system. It potentially depresses job search intensity, has an impact on the quality of labour inputs, 
and may result in loss of human capital or skills. The moral hazard problem may also cause rising 
wage pressures for employers and an increase in voluntary unemployment (see Classen (1977), Blau 
& Robins (1986), Kiefer & Neumann (1985), and Addison & Blackburn (2000)). Policy-makers are 
thus challenged with creating an unemployment insurance system that best handles the financial 
constraints and moral hazard implications of the UI system, in a bid to settle on a system which 
improves worker‟s welfare. 
  
Mortenson (1977) was the first to seriously model the impact of an unemployment insurance program 
on job-search and other outcomes of unemployment. By utilizing the dynamic search model 
technique, Mortenson acknowledges that UI‟s impact on the labour supply is theoretically ambiguous 
due to a wide spectrum of parameters in UI schemes, which determine the individual‟s eligibility and 
consequently, the person‟s response to the scheme. This includes variations in replacement ratios, 
tax exemptions and the relative costs of unemployment on both the workers as well as their 
employers (Feldsten (1978) and Topel (1983)). In 1997, Hopenhayn & Nicolini designed an optimal 
unemployment insurance system by solving a repeated principal agent problem, involving risk-averse 
agents and a risk-neutral principal. They found that if principals have limited foresight on the agents‟ 
search efforts, then the optimal long-term contract must consist of a replacement ratio, which 
decreases over the period of unemployment. This is to ensure positive job-search incentives for 
employees.  
 
Hasen & Imrohoroglu (1992) and Acemoglu & Shimer (1998), by incorporating the element of risk-
aversion into the tractable general equilibrium model of job search, show that an increase in 
employees‟ risk-aversion reduces wages, unemployment and investment. Despite this, they also note 
that UI has a reverse effect generated by the moral hazard, as the insured workers become more risk-
loving and susceptible to higher unemployment risks due to seeking high-wage jobs. Hence, given a 
market with risk-adverse participants, a moderate UI benefit program can not only reduce uncertainty 
of the claimants through risk sharing but also increase aggregate output. Holmlund (1997) 
investigates the nature of this market imperfection relative to the appropriate design of UI policies. He 
finds that if workers can self-insure through saving and borrowing, the case then for a (generous) 
public UI is not worth considering. Engen & Gruber (1995) find that when households are faced with 
higher levels of uncertainty in terms of income, they will begin to hold more assets than otherwise. 
 
Empirically, the evidence for either a resource or substitution effect is mixed: Ehrenberg & Oaxaca 
(1976) with much specification difficulty find no significant unemployment spell duration impacts in 
their analysis of National Longitudinal Sample (NLS) in the United States. Moff & Nicholson in 1982, 
successfully found a significant, positive correlation between the length of the unemployment spell 
and the amount of UI benefits by using a job search model, and conceded that measurement error 
and specification problems are significant in altering the results of this analysis. Cross-country 
regressions, like those of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), also found that amount of benefits has 
a strong, positive effect on long-term averages of national unemployment rates. In their treatment of 
different benefit breakdowns, they also found that the level of spending relative to GDP does not 
reflect the true picture of the benefit received by the individual recipient. Put differently, depending on 
an individual country‟s population size, one may have a high-spending ratio but not a generous social 
security program - alluding to the fact that the true impact of any UI system depends on the climate of 
the labour market as well as the design of the UI program. 
 
Concerning the income smoothening effect of UI systems, Gruber (1994) in a panel study finds a 
small but significant role for UI in consumption smoothing during periods of joblessness. He found that 
the poor in general are less capable of smoothening transitory income shocks relative to permanent 
income, as they have extremely low and limited savings. As a result, they exhibit excess sensitivity of 
consumption to cash-in-hand. Gruber then studied the individual behaviour during the weeks before 
benefits lapse and found that the probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just before 
the expiration of the benefits. In other words, employees are more sensitive to claiming rights than to 
benefit amounts. In the difference-in-difference study of the same year, he found that when 
employees‟ rights of claiming the UI are extended, the probability of an unemployment spell ending 




becomes substantially higher. This suggests that overly generous UI systems could have a serious 
moral hazard cost attached to them, in subsidizing unproductive leisure and creating job 
disincentives. Chetty (2008) confirms this finding in a later study. 
 
In developing countries, Cunningham (1997) examines the impact of Brazil‟s new unemployment 
insurance program on job transitions. The results suggest that the probability of workers remaining in 
the formal sector does not significantly increase with their eligibility for benefits. Using the Danish 
micro data, Lentz (2007) successfully developed a U-shaped relationship between unemployment 
duration and the income level of the worker and proved that the curvature of the utility of an 
individual‟s consumption functions (i.e. risk-aversion) is crucial in determining which effect dominates 
the outcome. Van Ours & Vodopivec (2006) in a difference-in-difference investigation; find that 
shortening the duration of benefits does not affect the quality of post-unemployment jobs under the 
Slovenian Insurance Scheme. Nor were there any changes in wage levels before or after the system 
reform. Krueger & Mueller (2009) note that workers who expect to be recalled by their former 
employers have considerably less incentive to search for a job than the average unemployed workers 
do. They also find that job search is inversely related to the level of generosity prescribed in terms of 
the unemployment benefits. 
 
3. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
The Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) is an integral part of the South African welfare system, and 
is designed to serve as a safety net for workers in the formal, non-institutional sectors in South Africa. 
South Africa has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, standing at roughly 23%, 
thereby strengthening the case for implementing an unemployment insurance system in South Africa. 
According to the Unemployment Insurance Act of 2002, all qualified employers and employees are 
required to contribute on a monthly basis to the risk-sharing fund
3
. In exchange, the contributor or the 
dependent (in case of a contributor‟s death) earns a weekly credit, which entitles them to claim 
unemployment insurance benefits. In addition, the reason for claiming the UIF must be involuntary, 
and may include illness, maternity and so on. Voluntary unemployment due to resignation and 
disciplinary dismissals disqualify employees from claiming UIF benefits. 
 
When compared to other unemployment insurance systems around the world, the UIF system in 
South Africa is arguably fairly stringent and does not provide generous benefits. Firstly, the system 
provides benefits exclusively to workers who have worked for no less than 24 hours per month. The 
credit system of the benefits is determined by the time worked by employees – employees receive 
one credit (day) for every six days on the job, and the accumulated credits may not exceed 238 days. 
Put differently, an employee who has been continuously working for more than four years is still 
limited to roughly only one-year‟s amount of credits for replacement benefits. Secondly, the „raw‟ 
income replacement rate (IRR) is low compared to international standards
4
. It ranges from 38-60% in 
a convex fashion, and is inversely related to the contributor‟s income level. Furthermore, the benefit 
level is invariant to the duration of the unemployment spell.  
 
Due to the stringent requirements and restrictions of the UIF system, it has ensured that it is purely 
contributor-funded and has adequate cash reserves. Hence, as a welfare system, the UIF system is 
unique in comparison to other social welfare systems in South Africa in that it operates without any 
government subsidies (National Treasury, Budget Review 2011). In the latest fiscal year ending  31st 
March 2010, the fund paid out R4 536 million in benefits with 628 595 approved claims. At the end of 
March 2010, there were about 4.2 million unemployed individuals in South Africa (QLFS 2010 1st 
Quarter, StatSA), meaning that in the financial year ending March 2010, less than 15% of the 
unemployed received unemployment benefits. Some may argue that this is the result of factors such 
as a large informal sector, and the lack of administrative capacity on part of the UIF, as in most 
developing countries. However, unlike other developing nations, South Africa has a small informal 
sector, and in addition, the UIF was able to approve nearly 97% (779 604 out of 801 110) of all new 
claims in the latest financial year. Hence, the observed low number of claim-applicants is readily 
attributed to the fact that the majority of the unemployed are workers who have either a long history of 
                                                     
3
 See Chapter 1: Section III of the Unemployment Insurance Act, Application of the Act for details of the qualified applicants. 
4
 IRR in Slovenia is 80% and 65% in Czech Republic etc.  These raw rates exclude any specific conditions of the claiming 
period. 
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unemployment (with exhausted credits) or no prior employment history (and therefore accumulated 
credits) at all. 
 
Progressivity in the Income Replacement Rates 
 
As noted above, the manner in which the UIF determines income replacement rates is rather unique 
compared to unemployment insurance systems in other economies around the world. In countries 
such as Slovenia and Chile, income replacement rates are generally designed so that they are variant 
to the duration of unemployment, but proportional to income (Vodopivec (2008)). These income 
replacement systems are thus intentionally designed to promote incentives for workers to return to 
productive employment, as well as to prevent workers from becoming reliant on the insurance 
benefits, thus hindering job search. The IRR in the South African case however is determined in the 
opposite manner: It is progressive in income and invariant to the duration of unemployment spell. In 
addition, while the claim period in many countries is set to a specific period, in South Africa the claim 
period is determined by the number of credit-days earned through prior employment states.  
 
Figure 1 below clearly shows the inverse relationship between the IRR and income in South Africa, 
thus ensuring that the replacement rates are progressive in structure. Put differently, the IRRs for 
those with higher incomes are lower than for those with lower incomes. Unemployed persons can 
claim at the calculated IRR rate for up to a maximum of 238 credits, depending on the number of days 
worked and thus the number of credits they have accumulated. For example, an employee who has 
continuously worked for more than 4 years, earning about R10 000 per month will be eligible for 38% 
constant replacement rate for as long as 14 months. In other words, a claimant will earn the same 
benefit for the period of eligibility, with the only limiting factor being the time period the claimant can 
claim for, and this is dependent on the number of credits accumulated by time worked prior to 
unemployment.  
 
Figure 1: UIF Income Replacement Rate by Deductible Incomes 
 
  
In contrast, unemployed individuals in many developing countries can claim income replacement 
benefits for a pre-determined period of time (regardless of employment histories) at a much higher 
income replacement rate. In these countries, after some time, the IRR drops in various degrees to 
create incentives for the unemployed to search for a job quickly. The UIF system in South Africa thus, 
in its calculation of the IRR, seems to be devoid of efforts to create incentives for workers to search 
for work, through for example, instead offering a lower IRR as the number of days of receiving 
benefits progresses.  
 
These distinctions between South Africa and other countries‟ unemployment insurance systems are 
fundamental in understanding the true impact UI has on the behaviour of the unemployed as they 
transit unemployment to other employment destinations. For one, it is clear that UI has no apparent 
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unemployment. Secondly, the UIF‟s IRR is aggressively progressive with regard to income, so 
ensuring that the system provides (relatively) more support to more vulnerable workers. 
 
4. A DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW OF NEW CLAIMANTS 
 
Data Description and Methodological Approach 
 
The dataset used in this paper is the first of its kind made available in South Africa. It includes 
information on all new claimants between April and August 2009. During this period, there were a total 
of 348 311 new UIF claims, 80% (or 275 586) of which were related to unemployment specific 
benefits due to the onset of the financial crisis. We dwell mainly on the 275 586 unemployment-
related insurance claims for the remainder of the analysis. Whilst there can be no doubt that this data 
period is very short, we would argue that the data and the subsequent analysis remains immensely 
useful for three reasons. Firstly, this is the first study, since 1994, on the raw micro-data of the UIF for 
South Africa and as such even a basic overview of claimants is useful. Secondly, there is no reason 
to believe that a longer time series would necessarily negate or devalue the results found here. 
Finally, we would argue that data and analysis on the IRR, claimants‟ characteristics and of course 
the claim-waiting period - is immensely useful in and of itself. 
 
For new UI claimants, the dataset contains personal information, as well as two crucial date variables 
that form the core of the claim waiting period analysis in this section. These variables are the 
termination date of employment and the application date for UIF benefits:  The termination date 
variable records the date on which claimants were terminated from employment (   ), While the 
application date variable notes the date on which a claimant applied to claim UIF benefits (    ) for 
instance, at a government Labour Centre.  Essentially, one could think of these dates as points where 
individuals transit from one state to the next: The termination date indicates the point at which an 
individual transits from state of employment to unemployment (without UIF benefits). The application 
date is the point at which the unemployed individual transits from the state of being unemployed 
without UIF benefits to the state of finally applying for the benefits. We define this period – the time 
between the termination date and the application date – as the claim-waiting period (  ), measured in 
units of days where: 
   (      )  
 
Using this claim-waiting period    as our variable of interest, we are able to analyse the behaviour of 
the recently unemployed. Essentially, we are looking at how employees respond to the period during 
which they do not receive benefits while unemployed. If we rank the claim-waiting period    by time 
and take the proportions, we can determine the take-up rate or the claim-waiting rate of 
unemployment insurance over the period   . The data from the UIF, which we illustrate below, will 
indicate heterogeneity in claim waiting periods amongst those individuals who lose their jobs, and are 
registered with the UIF. This heterogeneity, in one respect is reflective of differing observable and 
unobservable individual characteristics. In particular, we would expect for example on average, 
household wealth, skill levels relative to labour demand needs and savings - to vary positively with the 
claim-waiting period. Individuals who have savings, are better skilled or indeed have higher household 
wealth (inclusive of secondary wage earners within the household) – should be more likely to wait 
longer before registering their unemployment status with the UIF, in order to claim benefits. Hence, 
one can think of the claim-waiting rate,    as being determined jointly by the following: 
 
    (           ) 
 
Where apart from individual characteristics   , take-up rates should vary positively with household 
wealth   , skills    and Savings    (so  
        
    
     
  
    
     
 
    
     
). 
 
We note that according to the UIF Act, employees must make claims within six months after they 
have stopped working. We therefore, expect a convergence in the take-up rate of the UIF since all 
claimants are required to apply for UIF at or before six months. This convergence in the take-up rate 
of the UIF has a profound impact on our semi-parametric estimates of the covariates, which will be 
discussed in further detail in Section V where we survey the properties of non-parametric estimations 
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of the claim-waiting period   . But regardless of the convergence, the claim-waiting rate is still 
       for all applicants.  
 
New UI Claims by Individual Characteristics 
 
Table 1 below presents a basic descriptive overview of new claims by gender and age group during 
the period April to August 2009. During this period a total of 275 586 new claims were made, with the 
average growth rate in new claims for the period standing at 34%. The results thus suggest that the 
recession in South Africa in 2009 may have had a significant impact on the number of people 
accessing unemployment insurance benefits between April and August 2009, given official
5
  
unemployment decreased by 6%in the year before (Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 2008:Q2-
3). 
 
Males made almost double the number of new claims compared to females: almost 66% of the new 
claims made were by male claimants compared with 34% for females (a ratio of 2:1). Comparing this 
ratio to male:female employment ratios in the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 2009:Q1 (7:6) it 
is clear that new UI claimants were disproportionally male. 
  
Considering the average growth rate of new claims, we find that growth in female claimants (42%) 
outstripped growth in male claimants (30%), in the period. Thus, while new claimants in the period 
were predominantly male, the growth in claims by females was higher than for males. Importantly 
though, the number of new male and female claimants rose significantly from 26 thousand and 13 
thousand in April 2009 to 34 thousand and 19 thousand in August 2009. It is clear then that the 
recession had a significant impact on both the number of males and females accessing 
unemployment insurance in the period.  
 
Table 1: Number of New Claimants by Gender and Age Cohort: April – August 2009 










Female 13 267 18 882 19 419 22 807 18 899 93 274 42.45 33.86 
Male 26 450 37 327 38 422 45 686 34 427 182 312 30.16 66.14 
Age Cohort 
15 to 24 3 752 5 189 5 274 6 471 5 388 26 074 43.60 9.47 
25 to 34 14 229 19 858 20 104 24 492 18 804 97 487 32.15 35.39 
35 to 44 10 294 14 679 15 214 17 757 13 860 71 804 34.64 26.05 
45 to 54 6 561 9 818 10 259 11 658 9 331 47 627 42.22 17.25 
55 to 65 4 881 6 665 6 990 8 115 5 943 32 594 21.76 11.84 
Total 39 717 56 209 57 841 68 493 53 326 275 586 34.26 100.00 
Source:  Unemployment Insurance Fund 2009 
 
By age, individuals between the age of 25 and 34 experienced the highest number of total new claims 
(97 487) followed by those aged 35 to 44 (71 804) and 45 to 54 (47 627). This result could suggest 
that younger workers (25 to 34) were more likely to lose their jobs during the economic downturn in 
2009. Older workers with more experience are generally viewed as more productive than younger 
workers and are therefore less likely to be dismissed. These new-claim results by age-cohort are 
broadly consistent with QLFS data, which also shows a marked increase in youth unemployment 
rates during the recession, relative to older age cohorts (See QLFS 2009: Quarter 4).  
  
                                                     
5
 Narrow definition of unemployment. 





Table 2: Number of New Claimants by Termination Reason: April – August 2009 
Reason April May Jun Jul Aug Total 
% change 
Apr-Aug 
Share of total 
new claims 
Bus. Close 1 075 1 550 2 069 2 471 1 776 8 941 65.21 3.20 
Cont.expired 15 513 21 694 22 025 26 235 20 910 106 377 34.79 38.65 
Dismissed 8 907 12 084 12 243 15 326 12 017 60 577 34.92 22.00 
Insolvency 741 2 464 2 083 1 562 1 097 7 947 48.04 2.84 
Retrenched 11 167 15 407 16 070 19 209 15 009 76 862 34.40 27.90 
Other 2 312 3 009 3 346 3 690 2 517 14 874 8.87 5.41 
Total 39 715 56 208 57 836 68 493 53 326 275 578 34.30 100.00 
Source:  Unemployment Insurance Fund 2009 
 
Table 2 above shows that during the five month period between April and August 2009, of the 275 
586 new claims that were specifically for unemployment benefits, 39 percent of these new 
unemployment-related claims (106 377) were due to expired contracts, followed by retrenchments at 
27.89 percent (76 862 new claims) and dismissals at 21.98 percent (60 577 new claims).  
 
Unsurprisingly then, during the height of the financial crisis, business closures and insolvencies as 
reasons for claiming unemployment benefits had one of the highest average growth rates in number 
of new claims, albeit from exceptionally low bases. From the above table, the evidence points to the 
fact that, in the main, the typical unemployment insurance claimant over this period under review was 
a young, male worker. In addition, the results show that of all new claimants in this period, 6.5 out of 
10 had either been retrenched or their contract had ended. 
 
5. CLAIM WAITING PERIODS AND THE UNEMPLOYED  
 
Noting that we consider the claim-waiting period    , to be measured as the difference in the period 
between when the jobs is lost     and the individual‟s arrival at the UIF office     , we provide below 
an overview of some of the unemployed individual‟s characteristics and their variance across    . 
 
The Claim Waiting Period (   ) by Gender, Age and Replacement Rate 
Every employee in the country who recently became unemployed and wants to claim UI benefits must 
go through the process of being assessed by a UIF claims officer, to ensure eligibility of the employee 
for receipt of insurance benefits. Voluntary resignation and dismissal due to disciplinary punishments 
disqualify employees from claiming UI.  In this section, a shorter claim-waiting period should signal 
that the claimant is in need of immediate income relief in order to smooth their consumption 
schedules. This will however vary across individuals.  
 
Table 3 below presents the average claim-waiting period by gender and age. The first striking feature 
is that male claimants in general have a shorter waiting period than females before they claim, and 
this is true across all age groups. 
 
Table 3: Mean Claim-Waiting Period by Gender and Age Group 
  Female Male 
  
Waiting period 
Share of female new 
claims 
Waiting period 
Share of male new 
claims 
15-24 43.2 17.70% 38 10.40% 
25-34 59.3 31.40% 41.3 38.90% 
35-44 27.5 22.90% 25.4 24.30% 
45-54 36.8 9.30% 25.7 12.50% 
55-65 27.2 18.70% 29.5 13.90% 
Total 41.1 100.00% 33.6 100.00% 
Source:  Unemployment Insurance Fund 2009 
Note:  Waiting period measured in days 
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This is perhaps due to the fact that in many households males are the primary income earners, thus 
forcing them to apply for insurance benefits earlier in order to help them supplement their income and 
swiftly re-enter the labour market.  
 
From the results above, one could say that the claimants take on average, just more than a month 
before claiming the UI benefits, which suggests that UI claimants in South Africa are on average able 
to supplement their lost income for only a month, while searching for jobs. Interestingly, the waiting 
period for claiming UI benefits seems to decline from young to older age groups: While claimants 
between the ages of 25 and 34 have the longest waiting period of around 60 days, seniors between 
the age of 55 and 65 have the shortest waiting periods (just 27 days for females and 30 days for 
males). A likely explanation for shorter waiting periods among the oldest age cohort is the fact that 
these individuals are most likely preparing for retirement, in which case there is no need to 
accumulate credits and engage in job search. 
 
These results thus suggest that younger workers (between 15 and 34 years of age) may either be 
supplementing their income in some way, or may have other reasons for taking longer than older 
workers to claim UIF benefits. Indeed, it is possible, for instance, that younger workers may be more 
driven than older workers to find a job and may thus immediately attempt to re-enter the labour 
market rather than rely on their insurance credits. Whatever the reason for the time taken to apply for 
UIF benefits, these results do suggest that there is little sign of credible moral hazard problems in so 
far as younger age groups are concerned, since these workers take much longer than a month before 
becoming dependent on the UI system, to supplement their income once they have lost their jobs.  
 
Table 4 below presents the proportion of new claimants as well as lengths of employees‟ claim 
waiting periods by income replacement (or benefit) amounts. The benefit amounts are disaggregated 
into quartiles while the accumulated credits are sorted into years for which employees worked. Almost 
61% of claimants in the fourth quartile of benefits (high-income bracket of approximately more than 
R12 000 per month) have accumulated near maximum claiming-credits or have worked for more than 
four years. In contrast, claimants in the first quartile (lowest benefit amounts) have, for the most part, 
worked for short periods and are therefore claiming with few benefit credits. This result suggests, as 
expected, that high-income workers have longer employment episodes than low-income workers and 
therefore have more credits for claiming UI benefits.  
 
In terms of the claim-waiting period   , low-income earners (1st quartile benefit amount) with a long 
employment history (worked for more than four years) wait for 48 days – or more than double the 
length of waiting time of high-income earners (4th quartile benefit amounts) – with an equally long 
employment history. This then suggests that low-income earners (with associated low benefit 
amounts) are not incentivized to claim UI benefits more quickly than high-income earners, despite the 
fact that the IRR is progressive in income. Put differently, it appears then that the benefit amount of 
R739.77 per month could be simply too low to incentivize the more vulnerable amongst the recently 




For high-income earners on the other hand, the replacement amount of R3209.05 seems to 
incentivize the claimants, particularly those with longer work histories: Claimants with more than four 
years of work history prior to unemployment on average claim within just three weeks or 21 days, 
while workers with three to four years of work history claim within 27 days.  
  
                                                     
6
  Indeed, it could also mean that the high-income earners do not have sufficient additional wealth, which induces them to claim 
early. 




Table 4:  Claim Waiting Period by Replacement amount and Employment spell quartiles 
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< 1 year 43 6.80% 37 9.30% 58 6.20% 42 2.30% -0.02 
1 - 2 years 33 6.90% 48 6.50% 40 2.80% 42 1.50% 0.21 
2 – 3 years 28 3.10% 25 3.20% 27 3.60% 54 2.80% 0.48 
3 – 4 years 23 2.40% 38 1.40% 40 5.90% 27 2.90% 0.15 
> 4 years 48 6.30% 24 4.10% 33 6.80% 21 15.20% -1.29 
Source:  Unemployment Insurance Fund 2009 
Note:  Waiting period measured in days. 
 
Looking more closely at those with less than two years of work history across all the quartiles of 
benefit amounts shows that these individuals generally claim after more than five weeks since 
termination. Those in the third quartile with less than one year of work history, wait even longer (for an 
average of eight weeks) prior to claiming unemployment benefits. This suggests that the amount of 
credits accumulated is important in determining how long unemployed people wait prior to claiming 
UIF benefits. In turn, those with longer work histories (2 years or more), tend to apply for 
unemployment benefits more quickly. The exception to this is those with more than four years of work 
history in the lowest quartile of benefits. For this cohort, the benefit amount itself may be just too low 
to incentivize this cohort to apply more quickly.   
 
In summary, the results suggest that the time taken to apply for benefits is dependent on both the 
amount of credits accumulated as well as the benefit amount. In particular, although IRRs are 
progressive in income, those in the lowest quartile of benefits do not apply for benefits more quickly – 
benefit amounts appear to be just too low for those in the lowest quartiles. On the other hand, high-
income employees with high associated income replacement and short employment episodes are 
apparently incentivized to claim UIF benefits more quickly. Once high-income employees accumulate 
sufficient credits though, they resort to claiming UI in the shortest timeframe compared to any other 
groups.  
 
The Claim Waiting Period and Unemployment History – A Non-Parametric Approach 
 
The basic approach to nonparametric analysis is estimating the shape of the survival – or for the 
purpose of this paper, the claim-waiting rate – using the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate. Essentially, 
we are estimating the probabilistic function of remaining in a state of unemployment and not applying 
for the UI benefits at time t.  It is worth noting that in the conventional Survival model, the claim-
waiting function    here is referred to as the survival function: S(t) = 1- ∫h(t)∂t, or if in discrete time: St 
= Π(1-ht) for all t from starting time until the time of transition.  
 
However, the same logic can be applied to analyse the period between     and   , except here the 
hazard rate (ht) becomes the take-up rate (θt), and the Survival function (St) becomes the claim-
waiting rate function   . So basically, the conventional terminologies used for Survival analysis: the 
„survival‟ and the „hazard rate‟ functions on either employment or unemployment spells are substituted 
by the “claim-waiting rate” function and „take-up rate‟ functions respectively, to reflect that it is the 
precisely the time taken by the recently unemployed to apply for UI benefits that we are interested in.  
 
The estimates presented here are separated into male and female groups as well as by sub-groups. 
As mentioned earlier, due to the fact that the unemployed must claim benefits within six months of 
becoming unemployed to ensure that their entitlements to UI do not lapse, the survival rate for 
claimants will tend to converge at or before roughly 180 days. Figure A1 attached in the appendix 
shows that female claimants with a history of claiming UI benefits have a significantly lower rate of 
failure than females without. Male claimants, on the other hand, interestingly show the opposite result: 
Males with a history of claiming UI have a higher rate of failure than males without a history. The gap 
between the survival functions among females with and without a history is also noticeably wider than 
it is between the male claimants although males in general have a higher rate of failure than females. 
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The distinctive difference between the gaps suggests that claimants by gender have decidedly 
different claiming-rates given prior history of claiming from the UIF. We speculate once again that this 
may be due to males‟ responsibilities as primary income earners in traditional households. However, 
with limited information on claimants‟ household dependents and other household characteristics in 
the data, we cannot confirm this hypothesis.  
 
In terms of results by location of claimants, Figure A2 in the appendix shows the survival functions of 
claimants in metropolitan areas versus claimants in non-metropolitan areas. For both males and 
females, the survival functions for claimants in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas are quite 
similar in (roughly) the one-month period following unemployment.  
 
After a period of roughly one month however, claimants in non-metropolitan areas have a higher take-
up rate than claimants in metropolitan areas. This may be due to the fact that claimants in non-
metropolitan areas find it harder to supplement incomes compared to those in metropolitan areas. An 
alternative explanation may be that potential claimants in metropolitan areas feel that there is a 
greater likelihood of finding jobs compared to their counterparts in non-metropolitan or rural areas, 
with the result that they are less anxious to seek UI benefits. By gender, the survival functions show 
that the gap between claimants in urban and rural areas is wider for females than for males. The Log-
rank test (attached in the appendix) suggests that there is a significant spatial difference between 
waiting periods for both males and females. 
 
The Claim Waiting Period and Benefit Values 
 
From the data analysis earlier, we identified two main hypothetical sources of incentives that may lead 
to moral hazard problems under the UI system. The first source of moral hazard is the benefit amount 
of the UI claim. The intuition is that excessively generous benefit amounts may incentivize claimants 
to become reliant on UIF benefits, and therefore render them less willing to find work. One would 
observe this moral hazard problem if the differences in survival rates across quartiles of benefit 
amounts are significant, and more specifically, if higher benefit amounts are associated with lower 
survival rates. This would then suggest that higher benefit amounts create disincentives for claimants 
in terms of how long they remain in unemployment. The second potential source of moral hazard is 
the number of days for which claimants can claim UI. In cases where claimants have a large number 
of credit days, claimants may be incentivized to remain in unemployment and exhaust their credits, 
where possible. In turn, those with few accumulated credits would perhaps have more sporadic 
employment episodes and lower claim-waiting rates. In summary, we are interested in analysing 
survival rates of claim-waiting periods keeping in mind incentive effects associated with benefit 
amounts and credit days. Indeed, the ideal design for the UI policy is to have as little influence as 
possible on people‟s claiming behaviour while providing a cushion to the unemployed so they can 
supplement incomes and search for employment. In terms of our analysis, we would therefore like to 
analyse claim-waiting rate functions by sub-groups, in particular, by income replacement amounts and 
accumulated credits. 
 
Figure 3 below presents the survival functions by quartiles of replacement (or benefit) amounts. 
Firstly, it appears from the graph that for the male cohort there are no significant differences in the 
rates of failure of male claimants based on their benefit quartiles. More specifically, the survival 
functions for males by benefit quartiles are not distinctly separate and parallel to each other 
(particularly prior to roughly 35 days), thus suggesting that benefit amounts are relatively insignificant 
in determining the take-up rate of claimants applying for UI benefits. 
 
Female claimants, on the other hand, have more differentiated survival functions with regard to 
benefit amounts. Interestingly though, female claimants in the lowest quartile of benefit amounts do 
not have the highest failure rate, suggesting that there is little indication of a moral hazard problem. 
Finally, as mentioned above, due to the six-month period for eligibility of claiming benefits post-
employment, the survival functions converge at roughly 184 days.  
 




Figure 3: Claim-Waiting Period (  ) Estimates by Benefit Amount 
 
 
Figure 4 below presents survival estimates by accumulated credits. We expect that the group of 
claimants that are most likely and quickest to claim UIF benefits are those with the largest 
accumulated credit days. The data bears this out – both female and male claimants in the fourth 
quartile of accumulated credit days all claim within one month or two months at the maximum. Put 
differently, those who have been working for four years or more are quickest to claim UIF benefits.  
 
Figure 4: Claim-waiting Period (  ) Estimates by Accumulated Credit 
 
 
In summary, there is therefore no evidence of moral hazard problems as far as benefits amounts are 
concerned, but those with larger „stocks‟ of accumulated credit days claim UI much more quickly than 
those with very few accumulated days. This latter result then suggests that it is much more worthwhile 
for those who have become unemployed after a long employment spell to claim UI quickly rather than 
those with short employment spells. This result may, for instance, suggest that those with long 
employment spells may have larger and more long-term financial commitments and are therefore 
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Source: Unemployment Insurance Fund New Claimants April-August 2009
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Determinants of the Claim-Waiting Hazard rate (  ): A multivariate Analysis 
 
The model we use to analyse the probability of claiming UI is the Cox‟s proportional hazard (PH) 
model. It is a maximum partial-likelihood model, which means that it specifies only a functional form 
for the influence of covariates but leaves the shape of the claim-waiting rate as unspecified as 
possible. In essence, Cox's regression model may be considered a nonparametric or semi-parametric 
method.  
 
While few assumptions are required for the shape of the underlying hazard function, the model does 
require two properties. First, the Cox‟s model assumes a time-only based model and secondly, it 
predicts a multiplicative log-linear, functional relationship between the underlying hazard function and 
the covariates. These assumptions together are also referred to as the “proportionality assumption”. 
Again, it must be noted that we measure here the summed proportion of the duration between    and 
    as a representative of the “escape rate”, although this is of course not a standard approach in the 
unemployment insurance literature. 
 
It assumes that the hazard rate is consistent throughout time with the given covariates. Put differently, 
it assumes that the gap between hazard functions is solely attributable to variations in the covariates. 
Indeed, the severity of violation of this assumption has a direct relationship with the biases of the 
parameter estimates. As discussed earlier during the overview of the data, there is a serious concern 
about the violation of this fundamental assumption, as the legislature requires that all claimants apply 
for a claim within six months before the entitlement lapses. As a result, regardless of covariate 
attributes, the survival functions will converge at or before the analysis time of 184 days 
(approximately 3 months).  Hence, while there is no concern for right-censored data in the sample 
(due to the certain failure within six months), there is the violation of a key assumption of 
proportionality. This means that the parameter estimates will be free of censored data bias, but 
vulnerable to proportionality bias. The estimates will only be applicable within the analysis time of six 
months and statistically unreliable as well as legally meaningless after this period. Ultimately, the 
problem with this proportionality assumption is that the effects of the covariates are over-estimated 
and exaggerated over time. 
 
Despite the violation of the proportionality assumption, semi-parametric Cox‟s proportional hazard 
model is still preferred to the normal, logistic regression for two key reasons. Firstly, logistic 
regression is only suitable under time-stationary conditions and we are interested in the magnitude 
and direction of the effects of observed covariates, controlling for time-dependence. Secondly, we 
have no clear idea about the functional shape of time-dependence; therefore, it seems logical to 
adopt a semi-parametric specification rather than a parametric one (Blossfeld et al. (2007)). 
 
Econometric Approach and Results 
 
The central question in our econometric estimation is to estimate the impact of relevant factors on the 
unemployed applying for UI benefit at different rates. In other words, what affects the probability of the 
event of applying for UIF benefits at time t (the claim waiting hazard rate  (   ) conditional on a 
system of covariates   and unobserved characteristics,  . Cox‟s proportional hazard model can fully 
be formally written as: 
 
 (   )   ( )    ((       )    ) 
 
where X contains the system of covariates used to describe the survival function θ or the resultant 
hazard function, B is the vector of parameters associating the system of covariates and the probability 
of claiming function or the claim-waiting hazard function. Ω represents the baseline claim-waiting 
hazard rate function in terms of time. Put simply, Cox‟s Proportional Hazard model is assuming a 
time-only base model Ω(t) called the baseline hazard on which the function of covariates builds in 
order to estimate the hazard function of waiting  (   ). The baseline hazard is the rate for the 
respective individual to claim the UIF when all independent variable values are equal to zero. When 
all covariates are equal to zero, the hazard or the probability ratio provides the odds of an event 
occurring faster or slower given pure time. The standardized parameter coefficients of the covariates 
are a measure of the relative importance of the covariate to the take-up function, while controlling for 
time. In other words, it is measuring relative risk and not absolute risk. 





To identify the behavioural patterns of individuals during post-employment, but prior to applying for 
UIF benefits, we set the event of “failure” in the study as the instant at which claimants arrive at the 
local labour centres and apply for UI benefits. In other words, our dependent variable is the probability 
of the unemployed resorting to claiming the UIF.  
 
If the covariate‟s coefficient is negative, it means that the higher the covariate, the lower the 
probability of claiming (or the lower the take-up rate). In turn, a positive coefficient means that the 
greater the covariate, the greater the claiming probability (or higher the claim-waiting rate rate). Given 
the legally inferred six month maximum claim-waiting period, we model the hazard function for those 
six months when individuals have been unemployed and living without unemployment benefits, and 
when they eventually apply to claim UIF.   
 
We may expect employees with high wages and, therefore, high benefit amounts, to have higher 
hazard rates than employees with low wages and therefore low benefit amounts. In the main, 
however, given our descriptive data above, we do not expect the benefit amount to exert a significant 
influence on a claimant in terms of seeking UI benefits. We anticipate claimants to accumulate 
claiming credits, as opposed to exhausting them. In other words, most claimants would rather work 
than be unemployed, suggesting that the UIF system is devoid of moral hazard problems. 
 
Table 5 below presents the parametric results using Cox‟s proportional hazard model with time-
dependent covariates. The time-dependent covariates are all significant suggesting that there is an 
unmistakable violation of the proportionality assumption required for duration analysis. Due to this 
violation, we will not reflect on the quantitative values of the coefficients as they are biased. However, 
we will interpret the signs for the variables that can help describe the claim-waiting hazard rate of the 
unemployed. The covariates in the model consist of the following continuous variables: claimants‟ 
age; replacement values per credits and available credits to claim. The model also contains the 
following discrete or dummy variables: A history of claiming the UI; reasons for claiming the UI; 
location dummy for whether claimant resides in a metropolitan area, and finally the education variable 
for if the claimant is a high school certificate holder or a formal degree holder. 
 
Table 5: Male and Female Take-up Rate Equations  
  Female  Male 
VARIABLES F1 F2 F3 F4  M1 M2 M3 M4 
          
Benefit amount -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
-0.000***  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 
Available credits -0.002*** 
 
0.003*** 0.001***  0.005*** 
 
0.005*** 0.005*** 
Claim history -0.862*** -0.585*** -0.813*** -0.819***  1.601*** 1.423*** 1.126*** 1.608*** 
Dismissal -0.548*** -0.519*** 
 
-0.419***  -0.008 0.048 
 
-0.001 
Contract Expired 0.268*** 0.033* 
 
0.387***  0.647*** 0.672*** 
 
0.644*** 
Dismissed 0.476*** 0.433*** 
 
0.687***  0.444*** 0.626*** 
 
0.456*** 
Insolvency 0.594*** 0.570*** 
 
0.837***  0.740*** 0.975*** 
 
0.751*** 
Retired 0.982*** 0.963*** 
 
1.394***  0.907*** 1.094*** 
 
0.873*** 
Staff Reduction 1.488*** 1.419*** 
 
1.774***  1.433*** 1.717*** 
 
1.451*** 
Severance Package 1.655*** 1.635*** 
 
2.009***  1.292*** 1.645*** 
 
1.308*** 
Urban 0.715*** 0.764*** 
 
0.696***  0.495*** 0.497*** 
 
0.493*** 
Certificate -0.636*** -0.582*** 
 
-0.606***  -0.221*** -0.310*** 
 
-0.213*** 
Degree -1.210*** -1.001*** 
 
-0.952***  -0.694*** -0.916*** 
 
-0.678*** 












-0.000*** -0.000***  
  
0.000*** -0.000* 
     
 
    Observations 87,691 87,691 87,691 87,691  189,498 189,498 189,504 189,498 
Source:  Unemployment Insurance Fund 2009 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Results in Table 5 indicate that female claimants have a higher claim waiting period or take-up rate 
period as their age goes up, controlling for all other covariates. The male claimants, on the other 
hand, are exactly the opposite: The claim-waiting hazard rate decreases as their age increases, 
ceteris paribus. Put differently, older male claimants are more reluctant to claim than older females, 
possibly indicating differences in family responsibilities between the sexes. It is unfortunate that, in 
this data set, there is no information about claimants‟ household characteristics to explain a claimant‟s 
response time to claim. 
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The covariate benefit value suggests that there is a significant difference, but miniscule amount of 
impact, of the benefit amount on the claim-waiting hazard rate of the UIF for both female and male 
claimants. This suggests that the incentive effect created by the replacement amount on the 
claimant‟s claim-waiting hazard rate, if any, is negligible. The negative coefficient (for females) 
suggests that the higher the benefit amount, as well as its functional independent variable (income), 
the less likelihood of claiming early in the period. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the UIF is not 
an overly generous benefit system, and does not increase individuals‟ claiming-rates, but rather 
depresses claiming-rates for those with high incomes. Put simply, when controlling for a range of 
factors, agents with higher wages would prefer work to claiming benefits. 
 
Relative to the impact of available credits on   , the coefficient is positive for both females and males, 
suggesting that the hazard rate is higher as workers‟ accumulated credits increase, ceteris paribus. In 
other words, people tend to claim only when they have accumulated sufficient credits, as workers try 
to avoid sporadic employment episodes, and they would rather remain in employment than be out of a 
job. These findings together are an early suggestion that there may be no apparent sign of moral 
hazard in people‟s behaviour towards claiming the UIF as far as the two main sources of work 
disincentive is concerned: the claiming credit and replacement amounts. 
 
The dummy variables (history and city variables) confirm the nonparametric estimates earlier. The 
coefficient for the dummy variable „history‟ is negative for female and positive for male. In other words, 
female claimants with a history of claiming UI benefit before have a greater waiting period and are 
slower to claim than females without a claim history. Male claimants, on the other hand, are the 
opposite: Male claimants with a history of claiming the UI benefit have a higher tendency of claiming 
than males that did not have histories. The city dummy variable indicates that claimants of both sexes 
are equality affected by the locational significance of where they made the claims. If claimants were 
residing in metropolitan areas, then they have a higher claiming speed than those do not reside in the 
metropolitan cities. However, this finding appears to negate the nonparametric estimate observed 
earlier. 
 
The education dummy variables indicate a very interesting pattern of behaviour for the claimants to 
claim UIF. Individuals with a higher qualification have the lowest probability to claim benefits and have 
the longest waiting period than those without higher education. If a female individual without 
education who passed secondary schooling has the hazard rate of one, then a degree holder would 
have only an absolute claim-waiting hazard rate
7
 of 0.386 and an individual with a secondary 
certificate will suffer a hazard rate of 0.545. The educational gap between males is slightly more 
moderate than between females. If a male individual without education who passed secondary 
schooling has the hazard rate of one, then a degree holder would have the hazard rate of 0.507 and 
an individual with a secondary certificate will suffer a hazard rate of 0.808. This may be the result of 
two factors: First, the employment probability for the degree and certificate holders is high relative to 
the non-holders. They are, therefore, reluctant to claim since they are expecting to be re-employed 
soon in any case. Secondly, due to higher income levels for these skilled claimants, they possess a 
much more even and well-protected consumption pattern than the unskilled or the poor. Hence, the 
need and the probability of claiming the UI for the educated is relatively lower than for the unskilled.  
 
Given the above evidence on the behavioural tendency of the new-claimants (or the recently 
unemployed), we can effectively improve the targeting mechanism of other welfare policies to one that 
is aimed at those who are desperately in need of welfare assistance. In particular, the conventional 
wage subsidy mechanism could for example be improved to be more allocatively efficient by 
incorporating the claim-waiting period as a determinant into the decision rule on the condition of re-
employment through the UIF. In this manner, not only will the individual heterogeneity, which affects 
workers‟ reservation wage levels, be taken into account, but it could potentially minimize the likelihood 
of job losses in the economy.  
 
  
                                                     
7
 One can easily extrapolate the absolute hazard rate from relative hazard ratios by taking the exponents of the covariate 
coefficients. 




6. CONCLUSION   
 
This paper examined the claim-waiting rate of the unemployed under the South African 
unemployment insurance fund system. The South African Unemployment Insurance model is rather 
unique relative to unemployment insurance systems around the world in that it is progressive in 
income and yet invariant to time. The only time-dependent factor in the UIF is a work requirement, 
which translates into claiming credits for the claimant. The study estimated the determinants of the 
take-up rate (on the basis of available evidence) of the claimants by using both nonparametric and 
semi-parametric statistics. 
 
Our initial results on this restrictive dataset suggest that there were neither credible signs nor support 
for the idea that UIF is creating work disincentives among workers, as well as any kind of moral 
hazard problems that may affect the sustainability of the fund. Claimants do not rush to exhaust their 
accumulated credits and appear to be indifferent to the income replacement amount. Instead, workers 
with the highest take-up rate are those who have continuously worked for a substantially long period 
(longer than four years). In addition, the take-up rate is positively associated with the quantum of 
accumulated credits, which suggests that claimants would rather stay in employment instead of 
becoming recipients of the UIF benefits.  
 
Our results also reveal that higher education degree holders have the least motivation to claim UI for 
perhaps two reasons. First, the employment probabilities for the degree holders are higher relative to 
non-degree holders. Second, claimants with degrees also have higher income levels prior to being 
unemployed, so they possess deeper household safety nets than claimants who are unskilled or poor. 
Hence, the need and the risk of claiming the UI are much lower for the skilled workers than the 
unskilled. 
 
Ultimately though, the above paper has shed some, hopefully, illuminating light on the behavioural 
responses of claimants to the UI benefits offered to them in South Africa. The results suggest that 
whilst the UI system in South Africa remains solvent and does not induce moral hazard problems – 
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Figure A 1: Gap in Claim-waiting Period by Replacement Rate and Employment Spell 
 
Note:  Waiting period measured in days. 
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Figure A2: Take-up rate estimates by Location 
 
 
Table AT1: Log-Rank tests results for all covariates 
  Female Male 
                                History of claiming 
  Observed Expected Observed Expected 
No History 74655 61860.8 167867 174915 
History 13036 25830.2 21637 14588.8 
  chi2(1) 11811.1 chi2(1) 3947.78 
  Pr>chi2 0 Pr>chi2 0 
Urban/Non-Urban 
Non-Urban 42786 35715.1 100436 94499 
Urban 44905 51975.9 89068 95005 
  chi2(1) 2739.71 chi2(1) 816.81 
  Pr>chi2 0 Pr>chi2 0 
Benefit Amount Quartile 
1
st
 21925 16595.4 48732 64144.8 
2
nd
 22706 22155.9 46017 41144 
3
rd
 21137 32865.4 47376 45609.6 
4
th
 21923 16074.3 47373 38599.7 
  chi2(3) 9881.49 chi2(3) 7109.12 
  Pr>chi2 0 Pr>chi2 0 
Accumulated Credits Quartile 
1
st
 25013 37560 47620 48947.9 
2
nd
 18922 15622.7 49690 55699.8 
3
rd
 24593 26675.3 45407 59044.2 
4
th
 19163 7833.03 46787 25812.1 
  chi2(3) 26022.7 chi2(3) 23369.8 









































Source: Unemployment Insurance Fund New Claimants April-August 2009




  Female Male 
                                                          Province 
Eastern Cape 8022 9999.83 19251 22922.7 
Free State 1919 1847.07 8414 8416.46 
Gauteng North 6526 5679.52 13611 29788.2 
Gauteng South 11313 7346.65 40699 33547.4 
Kwazulu Natal 17571 10690.3 39993 30500.6 
Limpopo 2607 2363.52 9881 10821.6 
Mpumalanga 10018 7861.66 11733 9650.3 
North West 2154 2274.15 17952 12736.1 
Northern Cape 1553 1623.28 2958 3243.33 
Western Cape 26008 38005 25012 27877.5 
  chi2(9) 13431.8 chi2(9) 19901.8 
  Pr>chi2 0 Pr>chi2 0 
                                                          Reason of Termination 
Business Closed 5770 3970.99 2121 2365.43 
Constructive Dismissal 84 96.76 99 138.72 
Contract Expired 37568 49548.7 68201 66334.4 
Dismissed 19627 17681.1 43689 53878.6 
Insolvency/Liquidation 1372 1208.17 3374 3462.71 
Retired 6447 4798.11 5382 4876.65 
Retrenched/Staff Reduction 16597 10260 66147 58071.7 
Voluntary Severance Package 226 127.21 491 375.87 
 
chi2(7) 9800.32 chi2(7) 3521.77 
  Pr>chi2 0 Pr>chi2 0 
                                                      Continuous variables 
_t Coef. P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
age 0.01398 0 0.01346 0.01451 
Benefit Amount 9.59E-05 0 8.96E-05 0.0001 
Available Credits 0.00393 0 0.00385 0.00402 
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